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Abstract 
Investment on the Ghana Stock Exchange has attracted keen interest from within and outside the 
country.  Foreign investors have grown substantially in developing markets over the last two decades, 
parallel with the increase in their impact. These investors seek to own large proportions of equities as 
well as acquire State Owned Enterprises, and as a result they have become influential on the 
performance of companies in which they invest. Previous studies show no conclusive evidence on the 
direction of the role of share ownership   on the financial performance of firms especially in developing 
economies. This research attempts to examine the effect of share ownership and investors’ involvement 
on performance of investee companies. The study was conducted using panel data regression analysis 
and Performance was measured by using Tobin's Q and Return on Asset (RoA). Significant statistical 
relationships were found in this research. The results of the research suggest that share ownership on 
the Ghana Stock Exchange is heavily concentrated in the hands of Ghanaians and that ownership 
concentration, institutional and insider ownership precipitate higher firm financial performance. There 
is the need to encourage concentrated ownership structure. Also, investments by insider and 
institutional ownerships should be promoted in order to ensure proper monitoring, reduced agency 
costs and improve performance. 
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1. Introduction  
Theoretically, was argued that the ownership concentration may improve performance by decreasing 
monitoring costs or decline due to the possibility that large shareholders use their control rights to 
monitor activities of the agents (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Stiglitz (1999) also asserted that when 
shareholders are dispersed, monitoring of mangers becomes a public good and hence is under supplied 
which affect financial performance of the firm negatively. As a result, all owners have little control 
over mangers, which may pursue goals different from maximizing financial performance of the 
company. This is likely to impair company financial performance. 
 
Indeed several authors asserted that ownership concentration act  as monitoring mechanism, endowed 
with incentives to reconcile the interests of shareholders and consequently a determinant in the value 
maximization for example, Jensen (1986), Stiglitz (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), They predict 
the possibility of concentrating ownership in the hands of a limited number of shareholders as a 
mechanism to  monitor the activities of the agent and ensure that the interest of the principal is 
projected. Furthermore, concentrated ownership may reduce managerial incentives to consume 
perquisites, expropriate shareholders’ wealth as a result of strict monitoring by the shareholders 
(Meckling, 1976). Thus concentrated share ownership would improve financial performance of the 
firm 
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 Thus Shareholders attempt to concentrate their share holding in order to have control and ensure that 
their interest is served to avoid most of problem which may emerge because of the conflict of interest 
between principal and agent.  On the other hands Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that dispersed share 
ownership may rather have adverse (entrenchment) effects in reconciling agency conflicts. This may 
lead to an increase in managerial opportunism; implying conflict of interest on the part of corporations’ 
agents Thus , diversify ownership  may prove necessary for management to have the capacity to handle 
complex organisational structures, diversify risk among shareholders and obtain large enough funds to 
acquire specific assets. 
 
Indeed empirical studies by number of researchers on performance implications of ownership 
concentration have produced mixed results. For example some empirical studies found that 
concentrated share ownership affects firm’s performance as the ownership concentration motivates 
innovation that leads to value maximization (Hill and Snell,1989). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) posited 
that equity concentration is more likely to have a positive effect on firm performance in situations 
where control by large equity holders may act as a substitute for legal protection in countries with weak 
investor protection and less developed stock markets where they also classify Continental Europe.  
 
Countering this, Fama (1983); Morck et al.(1988) point to the possibility of negative entrenchment 
effects on firm performance associated with high managerial ownership stakes. For example in areas 
where legal protection of minority ownership is absent, concentrated ownership is likely to be 
accompanied by weak and non- transparent disclosures with negative implication for firm performance.  
A study by Mayer, and Rossi (2007,) report that “one of the best established stylized facts about 
corporate ownership is that ownership of large listed companies is dispersed . . . in the U.S. and 
concentrated in most other countries.” Dispersion of ownership arises when shares are distributed 
among numerous petty stock holders.  However if there is an effective mechanism for legal protection 
of minority ownership rights, the problem of ownership dispersion may not be great. Thus the debate 
on the effect of share ownership concentration and firm’s financial performance is inconclusive.  
 
Apart from the results being inconclusive most of the research on ownership concentration and 
performance has been conducted in developed countries (Bergström, and  Rydqvist. 1990;  
Bebchuk,,1999; Allen,  and  Phillips, 2000).  However, there is an increasing awareness that the 
theories developed in developed countries based on research evidence collected on developed countries 
may have limited applicability to emerging market.  
 
This attributed to the vast differences in political, socio-cultural and business contexts between the 
developed and developing countries.  For example in a recent study on corporate governance by Zeitun 
and Gary ( 2007) suggest that social, economic and cultural factors of a country affect corporate 
ownership structure which in turn impacts on a firm’s performance. This, present an important 
opportunity for research into ownership concentration and performance of firms listed on Ghana Stock 
Exchange. Thus the main objective of this paper is to analyse the relationship between share 
concentration and performance of listed firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange.  
 
2. Literature  
2.1 The fundamental discourse between Ownership structure and Firm Performance 
Developed economies are largely characterized by the existence of a widely held ownership structure, 
highly liquid stock markets due to good investor protection and control of companies by professional 
managers on behalf of scattered shareholders (Bhasa2004). In these economies, corporate management 
has more power to make decisions, and these decisions may frequently be in their own interest, which 
may give rise to an agency cost. Agency theory argues that ownership concentration may improve firm 
performance by decreasing agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
claim that agency costs consist of three different components: monitoring costs, bonding costs and 
residual loss. Monitoring costs are the control costs incurred by the principal to mitigate the deceitful 
behavior of the manager. Bonding costs are incurred to ensure that the manager takes decisions 
beneficial to the principal. Residual loss is a political cost that occurs when both the above kind of 
costs fails to control the divergent behavior of the manager.  
 
In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) showed formally how share identity can influence the agency 
cost and value of the firm. Since then, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance has attracted special attention.  Agency theory perspective and empirical literature thereof 
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usually considers share identity specially insider ownership as the main corporate mechanism that 
affects firm value. However, empirical evidence regarding the relationship between ownership 
concentration and the financial performance or firm’s value has shown mix results (e.g., Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Thomsen and pedersen  2006).  Counteracting the 
convergence-of Interest Hypothesis, Fama and Jensen (1983)   point out that a rise in the managerial 
share-ownership stakes may   have adverse (entrenchment) effects in reconciling agency conflicts and 
these can lead to an increase in managerial opportunism; implying conflict of interest on the part of 
corporations’ agents and hence hurting overall performance of the corporation. Furthering this 
proposition Jensen and Ruback, (1983) argued that the principal and the agent (agency cost theory) are 
never exactly the same, and thus the agent, who is the decision-making part, tends always to pursue his 
own interests instead of those of the principal. It means that the agent will always tend to spend the free 
cash flow available to fulfil his need for self-aggrandisement and prestige instead of returning it to 
shareholders. Hence, the main problem faced by shareholders is to ensure that managers will return 
excess cash flow to them (e.g. through dividend payouts), instead of having it invested in unprofitable 
projects (Jensen, 1986). If the principal wants to make sure that the agent acts in his interests he must 
undertake some Agency Costs (e.g. the cost of monitoring managers). The more the principals want to 
control manager decisions the higher their agency costs will be. 
 
The agency theory hypothesis that ownership concentration and share identity may improve firm 
performance by decreasing agency costs. This was first challenged by Demsetz (1983), who argues that 
the ownership structure of a corporation should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of decisions 
that reflect the influence of shareholders on the management of the firm which may influence agency to 
improve value of the firm. According to Demsetz (1983), there should be no systematic relation 
between variations in ownership structure and variations in firm performance. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) used profit as a measure of firm’s performance on a proportion of shares owned by the top five 
percent shareholders to evaluate the relationship between ownership concentration and firms’ 
performance.  They found no evidence of any relation between the profit rate and the ownership 
concentration.  
 
2.2. Empirical studies on share ownership and firm performance  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) investigated the important role played by concentrated ownership of shares, 
by examining the relationship between firm’s share price and ownership concentration.  They found 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. In a related study, Morck et al. 
(1988) re-examined the relation between corporate ownership structure and firms’ performance. They 
used Tobin’s q as a measure of firms’ performance. Their results revealed positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and Tobin’s q. 
 
Wu and Cui (2002) found that there is a positive relation between ownership concentration and Return 
on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) which are measures of accounting profits. However they 
reported a negative relationship between ownership concentration and market value of the firms which 
was   measured as share price per earnings ratio  (P/E) and market price to book value ratio 
(M/B).Studies on ownership structure and performance in developed countries firms substantially rely 
on the legal protection of investors consequently the ownership structure of these firms is found to be 
dispersed. In other areas where there is less reliance on elaborate legal protections, share ownership 
tend to be concentrated in the hands of  large investors and banks, for example Europe and Japan. In 
developing countries where legal protection is weaker, share ownership is typically heavily 
concentrated in hands of families. 
 
In emerging economies, where firm ownership is highly concentrated with family ownership, a positive 
and significant effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is proposed. Zeitun and Gary 
(2007) examined the relationship of ownership concentration, and firm performance both in term of 
accounting measures and market measures using a sample of public listed companies in the Jordan 
stock exchange, and found that there is a significant relation between ownership concentration and the 
accounting performance measures. Abor and Biekpe (2007) investigated whether the effects of 
corporate governance and ownership structure on the performance of SME’s in Ghana. They found that 
board size, board composition, CEO duality, inside ownership and family ownership have significant 
positive impacts on profitability.  
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However, interaction of these economic characteristics with governance and corporate structures and 
performance implications of these factors have not been examined extensively even though the 
empirical studies on ownership structure on firms’ performance, mostly from developed countries, 
have provided divergent evidence. These contextual differences across countries therefore, create 
another dimension to the ownership structure and performance issue.  Because of the contextual 
differences across countries, different relations between ownership and firm value could be expected.  
The problem is compounded where shareholder cannot rely on only the market regulators to allocate 
assets to the most productive firms Hashi (1997). It may be advantageous to employ several measures 
rather than select a single one relying on subjective assumptions about their appropriateness. For 
instance Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2001) employed labour productivity, profitability, and Tobin’s q as 
proxies for performance.  
2.3. Determinants of firm Performance  
Performance is a difficult concept, in terms of both definition and measurement. It has been defined as 
the result of activity, and the appropriate measure selected to assess corporate performance is 
considered to depend on the type of organization to be evaluated, and the objectives to be achieved 
through that evaluation Hunger et al (1997). Researchers   have offered a variety of models for 
analyzing corporate performance. However, little consensus has emerged on what constitutes a valid 
set of performance criteria Cameron, (1981). 
 
 Lewin et al (1986) for instance, have suggested that studies on corporate performance should include 
multiple criteria analysis. Thus different models or patterns of relationship between corporate 
performance and its determinants should be used to demonstrate the various sets of relationships 
between the dependent and the independent variables in the estimated models  (Schmidt,1993). Nickell 
et al.(1997), have identified   the following factors as the drivers of performance, namely firm size, 
competition, leverage, corporate control, and corporate demographic issues  
 
The effects of firm size on corporate performance have gained important attentions in the research of 
the firm. According to common intuition, the size of the firm has an important role in firm performance 
for many reasons. In a certain perspective of studies, size can be a proxy of firm resource. Since larger 
firms have more organizational resources, they give larger firms the better equipment to achieve their 
goals Penrose, (1959). Sizes can also proxy for the probability of default and the volatility of firm 
assets. It assumes that larger firms are more difficult to liquidate.  
 
Majumdar (1997) also point out that larger firms generate superior performance relative to smaller 
firms. A firm’s demographic characteristic such as number of outlets and the age or life stage of the 
firm as well as board size are seen by some researchers as driver of corporate performance. If there are 
economies of scale, a larger number of outlets mean a better performance, if not; more outlets lead to a 
worse performance. In a study on retail banks, Barnett et al. (1994) find single unit banks performing 
better. They argue that a firm’s emphasis on market positioning retards organizational learning.  
 
Again the age of a firm is said to have a consequence for performance. Firms have a cycle of growth 
and decline. Newly established firms generally have an enthusiastic and energetic crew, which should 
enhance performance. On the other hand young firms are confronted with start-up problems Cromie 
(1991). Older firms have overcome these problems, and can rely on experience and a network of 
existing suppliers and customers, which enhances efficiency. Birley (1990) find mature firms 
performing better.  
 
3.0.  Methodology  
This study employed data on listed firms at the Ghana Stock Exchange over a period of ten years 
spanning from 1999 to 2008.  The data were collected from different sources including audited 
accounts of the listed companies as well as from the fact book of the Ghana Stock Exchange. Panel 
data was developed and used for this study as it increases efficiency by combining time series and 
cross-section data.  To reveal the impact of ownership concentration on firm’s performance, the 
estimation procedure used by Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2001) was adopted modified as: 
 =  + 	 + 
          
 (1) 
Where 
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•   is performance measure, 
• αi   =  refers to time-invariant firm-specific effects  
• 	 are the independent (ownership concentration  and control) variables  
•   coefficients of ownership and control variables respectively 
• 
is a random disturbance. 
Based on the above general model the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance was 
evaluated using the model outlined below. 
PERF it = α0 + β1TOP5it + β2TOP5SQit+ β3DEBTit + β4FIRMSIZEit + β5BODSIZEit+  β6 BODSIZESQit   
+ β7AGEit + β8AGESQit  Ɛit               
 
 (2) 
Where  
• PERF it , is the   measure of the performance of the firms 
• αi   is a constant term that is the  intercept of  the regression equation 
• β  is the  coefficient of the variables and βi  represents the sensitivity of a company i’s 
performance  to changes  in the movements of the various variables  
• TOP5it     is the ownership concentration  of the ith firm 
• TOP5SQit is the square of the  ownership concentration  of the ith firm  
• FIRMSIZEit  is the size of the ith firm 
• BODSIZEit  is the board size of the ith firm 
• BODSIZESQit  is the square of  board size of the ith firm  
•  AGE
 
is the length of existence – age- of the  ith  firm  
• AGESQit   is the squre of the age of the ith firm 
• Ɛit    is the error term 
• The subscripts and i and t   represent listed firm and time respectively. 
In this study two performance measures were considered, namely return on assets and Tobin’s q. This 
choice is motivated by the assumption that these indicators may have different interpretations regarding 
firm’s performance. Return on assets is calculated by dividing income after tax by total assets. Tobin’s 
q is the ratio of market values of equity to the book value equity. Market capitalization is used as proxy 
for the market value of equity and is obtained from the GSE’s trading list from 1999 to 2008. 
 
4.0. Results and discussion  
The descriptive statistics of the performance indicators and level of share ownership concentration as 
well as   control variables are shown in Table 1. The average Tobin’s Q for the period under study is 
0.921453 with a high standard deviation of 1.552668 (155.27%). The results show that on the average 
firms listed on the GSE achieved a Tobin’s q of 92.15% which is quite high. However, the high 
deviation of 155.27% suggests that very few firms were able to achieve the average Tobin’s q. on the 
average, about 0.7644432 (76.44%) of shares of listed companies on GSE is in the hands of Top 5 
shareholders. This depicts that firms are concentrated and the result is fairly representative of the entire 
observations because its dispersion is about 0.1289022 (12.89%). A greater percentage of the assets of 
listed companies are financed with debt even though the deviation is very high (Mean; 0.654534 and 
Standard deviation; 0.7297543). The average of board size is 9.260337 with a deviation of 2.545818. 
Lastly, the average of the squared board size listed firms is 92.260337 with a very high variation of 
53.0221. ( Note 1) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test and sign test was conducted to test for the stationary and 
presence of multicollinearity respectively. The results of these tests showed that the variables were 
stationery and multicolliaritity is not a serious issue. Furthermore, the Hausman specification test was 
conducted and the result suggests that the firm fixed effects approach was the appropriate test to be 
employed for the data analysis. The value of the overall R-square from the regression equation 
involving Tobin’s q was 0.7540 representing 75.4%. This means that 75% of the dependent variable is 
explained by the explanatory variables. The model is also fit for the regression since the P-value (Prob. 
>F = 0.0000) is also statistically significant.  On the other hand the overall R-square from the 
regression equation with Return on Assets was 0.3646, that is, the explanatory variables explains 
36.46% if a change in the dependent variable. The P-value (Prob. > F=0.0000) is also highly 
significant. The regression results are presented in table 2 below (Note 2) 
The results indicate that ownership concentration is positively related to Tobin’s q. on the other hand 
the square of ownership concentration has a negative relationship with Tobin’s Q. However, they are 
jointly insignificant. Similarly, ownership concentration is positively related to Return on Assets while 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                           www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol 3, No 2, 2012 
 
83 
 
its square variable has a negative relation. Here both concentration and the square of concentration are 
highly significant at 1% level. Our results are in line with theory that concentrated ownership improves 
performance. This may be attributed to better monitoring of managers to restrains their opportunities to 
pursue their own interests then smaller and dispersed shareholders. The findings are also consistent 
with empirical evidence from the studies of Wu and Cui (2001), Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2001), 
Djankov and Cleassens (1999), Pohl et al. (1997), Barberies et al. (1996) and Earle and Estrin (1996) 
who in their various studies find positive relation between ownership concentration and firm’s financial 
performance. The negative relationship between the square of concentration and performance suggests 
that concentration has a non linear relation with performance. Performance increases with 
concentration, reaches the optimum level beyond which any increase in concentration results in a 
decrease in performance. Besides ownership concentration there may be other hidden factors that may 
affect performance. Contrary to expectation firm size is negatively related to Tobin’s q and return on 
assets. The results are statistically significant at 1% and 5% level respectively. Theoretically it is 
believed that larger firms improve performance since they have huge capital to acquire high technology 
equipment and employ highly skilled labour to improve performance. Our result is consistent with 
empirical findings by Haines (1970), Marshal (1961) and Marcus (1969) who found a negative 
correlation between firm size and profitability. 
On the other hand the results show that age is positively related to RoA and Tobin’s q. However, they 
are both insignificant. The results suggest that age has a positive impact on performance. It is argued 
that older firms may have built up reputation over the years and acquired considerable experiences to 
enable them compete favourably in the market. Over time, firms discover what they are good at and 
learn to be more efficient (Arrow, 1962; Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995). They specialize 
and find ways to standardize coordinate and speed up their production processes. As well as to reduce 
costs and improve quality. On the other hand the square of age is negatively related to return on assets 
and Tobin’s q and in both cases they are also found to be insignificant. This suggests that old age may 
make knowledge, abilities and skills obsolete and induce organizational decay (Agarwal and Gort, 
1996, 2002). Therefore performance may get to the optimum and then decline. 
The findings revealed that debt positively related to return on assets and Tobin’s q. it is however, that 
of Tobin’s q is highly significant at 1% while that of return on assets is insignificant. The findings 
suggest that debt has a positive impact on performance. This is in line with theory that the introduction 
of debt in the capital structure of the firm improves performance since it exerts pressure on 
management to work harder to settle their obligation. The finding is consistent with our expectation 
and that of empirical evidence by Michealas et al. (1999). Lastly, while board size is positively related 
to Tobin’s q, its square has a negative relation. The equation with return on assets however shows that 
both board size and its square are negatively related. However, the two equations reveal that they are 
all insignificant.  
5.0. Concluding remarks   
Generally on average, firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange achieved 92% ratio of market value to 
book value (Tobin’s q). Also about 76% of the share traded on the exchanged is held by Top 5% 
shareholders Large proportion of asset of these firms are financed by debt and board size is quite high 
with average of 9.The regression result revealed that ownership concentration has significant positive 
effect on performance (return on asset). Thus cconcentrated ownership improves return on asset 
however ownership concentration does not offer significant increase in market value of the firms. In 
the context of the above findings and conclusion corporate ownership structure of companies should be 
evaluated and monitored. In particular, concentrated ownership structure should be encouraged.  
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Note 1 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics of performance measures and level of ownership concentration    
 
Variables 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
         Std. Dev. 
 
             Min. 
 
    Max. 
Logroa  
Logtobin’s q 
TOP5% 
TOP5%SQ 
Firm size 
Age 
Agesq 
Bodsize 
Bodsizesq 
219 
259 
264 
264 
264 
264 
264 
264 
264 
 
-2.8427 
0.9215 
0.7644 
0.6009 
6.4347 
32.8485 
1275.4550 
9.2604 
92.1818 
 
0.9094 
1.5527 
0.1289 
0.1862 
1.4519 
14.0420 
944.7545 
2.5458 
53.0221 
 
-6.6748 
-2.4010 
0.3614 
0.1306 
2.9498 
5.0000 
25.0000 
4.0000 
16.0000 
 
-0.1528 
8.5675 
0.9836 
0.9675 
10.1799 
64.0000 
4096.0000 
19.0000 
361.0000 
 
Source: Ghana stock exchange field data (1999-2008) 
Note 2: 
Table 2: Regression Model results: concentration and firm performance 
Variables Logtobin’s q Logroa 
Coef.             t-statistic           Prob. Coef.           t-statistic           Prob. 
Top5 
Top5sq 
Firmsize 
Age 
Agesq 
Debt 
Bodsize 
Bodsizesq 
_cons 
R-sq 
F (.) 
Prob.>f 
4.4887            1.1900           0.2350 
-2.1550         -0.8300           0.4060 
-0.1144         -3.2200           0.0010 
0.0029           0.1700            0.8620 
-0.0003         -1.1600           0.2470 
1.7028           5.9400            0.0000 
0.0426           0.4100            0.6820 
0.0010          -0.1900            0.8470 
-1.9645       -1.2800            0.2010 
0.7540 
59.0100 
0.0000 
23.4547           5.0600            0.0000 
-15.8736          -5.000            0.0000  
-0.1074          -2.4500            0.0150 
0.0209             0.9800            0.3290 
-0.0003          -0.8100            0.4220 
0.0450            0.5900             0.5570 
-0.0220          -0.1600            0.8750 
-0.0015          -0.0230            0.8210 
 -10.9583       -6.0200             0.0000 
0.3646 
42.0001 
0.0000 
Source: Ghana Stock exchange (1999-2008) 
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